Productivity and performance in the public sector by Lefebvre, Mathieu et al.
Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/168140
[Downloaded 2019/04/19 at 01:49:11 ]
"Productivity and performance in the public sector"
Lefebvre, Mathieu ; Perelman, Sergio ; Pestieau, Pierre
Abstract
In times of budgetary difficulties it is not surprising to see the performance of the
public sector questioned. What is surprising is that what is meant by it, and how
it is measured, does not seem to matter to either the critics or the advocates
of the public sector. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a definition and
a way to measure the performance of the public sector or rather of its main
components. Our approach is explicitly rooted in the principles of welfare and
production economics. We will proceed in three stages. First of all we present
what we call the "performance approach" to the public sector. This concept rests
on the principal-agent relation that links a principal, i.e., the public authority, and
an agent, i.e., the person in charge of the public sector unit, and on the definition
of performance as the extent to which the agent fulfils the objectives assigned
to him by the principal. Performance is then measured by using the notion of
productive efficiency an...
Document type : Document de travail (Working Paper)
Référence bibliographique
Lefebvre, Mathieu ; Perelman, Sergio ; Pestieau, Pierre. Productivity and performance in the public
sector. CORE DISCUSSION PAPER ; 2015-52 (2015)
 2015/52 
 
 
■ 
 
 
 
 
 
Productivity and performance in the public sector 
 
Mathieu Lefebvre, Sergio Perelman and Pierre Pestieau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORE 
Voie du Roman Pays 34, L1.03.01 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Tel (32 10) 47 43 04 
Fax (32 10) 47 43 01 
E-mail: immaq-library@uclouvain.be 
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-44508.html!
1 
The Oxford Handbook of Productivity Analysis 
E. Grifell-Tatjé, C. A. K. Lovell and R. C. Sickles, Editors. 
 
Chapter 15th 
Productivity and performance in the public sector* 
 
Mathieu Lefebvre, Université de Strasbourg 
Sergio Perelman, Université de Liège 
Pierre Pestieau, Université de Liège and CORE, UCL. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In times of budgetary difficulties it is not surprising to see the performance of the public sector questioned. What 
is surprising is that what is meant by it, and how it is measured, does not seem to matter to either the critics or 
the advocates of the public sector. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a definition and a way to measure the 
performance of the public sector or rather of its main components. Our approach is explicitly rooted in the 
principles of welfare and production economics. We will proceed in three stages. First of all we present what we 
call the "performance approach" to the public sector. This concept rests on the principal-agent relation that links 
a principal, i.e., the public authority, and an agent, i.e., the person in charge of the public sector unit, and on the 
definition of performance as the extent to which the agent fulfils the objectives assigned to him by the principal. 
Performance is then measured by using the notion of productive efficiency and of "best practice" frontier 
technique. We then move to the issue of measuring the productivity of some canonical components of the public 
sector (railways transportation, waste collection, secondary education and health care). We survey some typical 
studies of productive efficiency and emphasize the important idea of disentangling conceptual and data problems. 
This raises the important question that given the available data, does it make sense to assess and measure the 
productivity of such public sector activities? In the third stage we try to assess the performance of the overall 
public sector. We argue that for such a level of aggregation one should restrict the performance analysis to the 
outcomes and not relate it to the resources involved. As an illustration we then turn to an evaluation of the 
performance of the European welfare states and its evolution over time, using frontier techniques.  The results 
confirm that countries with lowest performance grew faster but this is not sufficient to confirm a path towards 
convergence.     
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15.1 Introduction 
 
In both developed and less developed countries, one can speak of a crisis of the public sector. 
The main charge is that it is costly for what it delivers; costly at the revenue level (tax 
distortion, compliance cost) and at the spending level (more could be produced with less); 
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costly or at least costlier than would be the private sector. Even though this particular charge 
is rarely supported by hard evidence it has to be taken seriously because of its impact on both 
policy makers and public opinion. The purpose of this chapter is to address the question of 
whether we can measure the productivity of the public sector, a question that is very general 
and terribly ambitious. Consequently we will narrow it down by dealing with it in two stages.  
In the first stage we consider the public sector as a set of production units that use a number 
of resources within a particular institutional and geographical setting and produce a number of 
outputs, both quantitative and qualitative. Those outputs are related to the objectives that have 
been assigned to the production unit by the principal authority in charge, i.e., the government. 
If the principal were a private firm, the objective assigned to the manager would be simply to 
maximize profit. However with public firms or sectors there are multiple objectives. 
For example, in the case of health care or education, maximizing the number of QALYS 
(years of life adjusted for quality) or the aggregate amount of human capital respectively, is 
not sufficient. Equity considerations are also among the objectives of health and education 
policy. Within such setting the productivity is going to be defined in terms of productive 
efficiency, and to measure it, we will use the efficiency frontier technique. Admittedly 
productive efficiency is just a part of an overall efficiency analysis. It has two advantages: it 
can be measured, and its achievement is a necessary condition for any other type of efficiency. 
Its main drawback however is that it is based on a comparison among a number of rather 
similar production units from which a best practice frontier is constructed. Such a 
comparative approach leads to relative measures, and its quality depends on the quality of the 
observation units. There exists a large number of efficiency studies concerned with the public 
sector. Some focus exclusively on public units; others compare public and private units. We 
will present a small sample of these studies, whose characteristic is that even the best of them 
do not use the ideal data due to lack of availability. Particularly qualitative evidence is 
missing for both outcomes and inputs. Under the hard reality that data are insufficient, if not 
missing, the question is whether or not some productivity studies make sense. 
Whereas in the above studies there is a quite good relation between the outputs and the inputs, 
when we move up to an aggregate level the link is not clear anymore. For example, public 
spending in health is not related to the quality of health, for at least two reasons: health 
depends more on factors such as the living habits or the climate than on spending and 
spending can be higher where it is needed, namely in areas of poor health. For this reason, 
when dealing with the public sector as a whole we prefer to restrict our analysis to the quality 
of outcomes and not to the more or less efficient relation between resources used and 
outcomes. The problem becomes one of aggregation of outcome indicators. In this chapter, 
we illustrate our point by evaluating the performance of the European welfare states. We use 
the DEA technique with a unitary input. This technique gives different weights to each 
indicator and each decision unit, here each national welfare state. So doing, we expect that the 
weight given to a partial indicator and to a specific country reflects the importance that this 
country gives to this indicator. We thus meet the concern of political scientists that different 
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welfare states can have different priorities.1  This approach, which has been labelled benefit of 
the doubt by Cherchye et al. (2007a), was proposed by Melyn and Moesen (1991) and Lovell 
et al. (1995) as an alternative way to measure countries’ macroeconomic performance and 
used, among others, by Cherchye et al (2004) and Coelli et al. (2010) to measure the 
performance of European welfare states.2 
Accordingly, in the last section of this chapter we update Coelli et al (2010) using five 
normalized outcomes indicators – which concern poverty, inequality, unemployment, 
education and health – for the 28 European Union members states, 15 historical members 
(EU15) and 13 newcomers (EU13), over the period 2005-2012. We compare the results 
obtained using identical weights, an average social protection index (SPI), and the DEA 
benefit of the doubt approach, either without imposing constraints on outcomes weights, or by 
imposing 10% minimum weights on each of them. As expected, some countries’ rankings 
vary dramatically depending of the weighting approach (SPI, unconstrained or constrained 
DEA). Nevertheless when we analyse the dynamics of performance over the 2005 to 2012 
period a test of the mean reversion hypothesis confirms that countries with lower performance 
grew faster. Unfortunately this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for convergence 
and the tests we perform indicate that convergence in welfare states performance among the 
EU28 members is not yet achieved.     
To sum up the spirit of this chapter, we believe that the study of the productivity of the public 
sector should comprise two parts: an evaluation of the productive efficiency of its components 
and an assessment of its achievements as a whole. The next two sections are devoted to these 
two parts. 
 
15.2 Efficiency measures of public firms and services 
There is a long tradition of efficiency measurement in the public sector and a wide number of 
studies report the results of productivity comparisons concerning public firms and services. 
As we will illustrate here with some examples – railways transportation, waste collection by 
municipalities, secondary education and health care – there exists a gap between the ideal data 
needed for such assessments and the data used in the economic literature. On the one hand, 
there are the restrictions imposed by data availability – mainly sample size limitations, small 
number of units and short periods – which constrain the number of dimensions that could be 
taken into account simultaneously, independently of the methodology used. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to identify and to measure accurately the final outcomes, those which 
justify the public nature of the firm or the activity including quality dimensions. Reliable 
qualitative information on outputs is often missing. Also relevant quality features of inputs as 
well as information on the environmental conditions in which these firms operate are often 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Esping-Andersen (1990). 
2 The benefit of the doubt approach has been also applied to other fields, e.g. to measure the performance of European 
internal market dynamics (Cherchye et al. (2007b)); farms sustainability (Reig-Martínez et al (2011)); citizen satisfaction 
with police services (Verschelde and Rogge (2012)); citizens wellbeing (Reig-Martínez (2013)); or in the case of undesirable 
outputs (Zanella et al (2015). 
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neglected. We are interested in these deviations from the ideal data. Our goal is to present a 
list of variables for a few examples, that in our view would be the ideal dimensions to 
consider, assuming no data restriction. We rely on Pestieau (2009) for the description of ideal 
data. 
Furthermore, the objectives assigned by governments and regulatory agencies to public firms 
and public services are multidimensional. Other than technical efficiency and allocative 
(price) efficiency, they often include macroeconomic (growth and employment) and 
distributive (equity) targets.3 Most of the literature covered focuses only on efficiency without 
considering prices, costs minimization or profit maximization, nor macroeconomic and 
distributive targets.  There are however some rare exceptions.  
15.2.1 Railways transportation 
Our first example is productive efficiency in public railways transportation. The list of 
variables presented in Table 15.1 assumes no data availability restrictions. Besides output 
quantities, number of passengers, journey length and tons of freight transported, we include 
quality indicators: comfort, reliability of delivery and punctuality. Equity of access is also a 
key dimension: How accessible is railways transportation to different categories of the 
population, e.g. distinguished by income and location? Which are the types of inputs used in 
production: i) staff skills and experience; ii) type and quality of equipment; iii) length and 
quality of tracks; and iv) different sources of energy? In our view, all these dimensions are 
relevant and would be considered in a benchmark study. 
Furthermore, given the nature of the activity, railways companies operate, by definition, in 
different geographical areas and national institutional environments. Therefore, other than 
geographical characteristics, e.g. average stage length and population density, it is crucial to 
have information on railways sector regulations, e.g. autonomy of management, degree of 
competition, market contestability. Last but not least, we want to know if they are subject to 
community service obligations and, perhaps, to constraints regarding price discrimination. 
Over the last decade, several studies were published on European railways productivity. The 
aim of most of them was to analyze the effects of the European Commission railways 
deregulation policy, launched in the early nineties. The main objectives of this reform, as 
summarized by Friebel et al. (2008), were: (a) to unbundle infrastructure from operations; (b) 
to create independent regulatory institutions and (c) to open access to the railways markets for 
competitors. Most European countries slowly introduced these reforms and this gave the 
opportunity to make efficiency comparisons among them, particularly between vertically 
integrated and still unbundled companies. With the exception of Farsi et al. (2005), which 
study the productivity of Swiss regional and local railways networks, and Yu and Lin (2008), 
which compare European railways productivity in 2002, the studies surveyed in Table 15.1 
use panel data to draw conclusions pertaining to the effect of the ongoing deregulation 
process in the EU. In Table 15.1, as well as in the following tables in this section, we use 
                                                
3 As stated by Pestieau and Tulkens (1993), even if these objectives are not always completely compatible, there 
is one dimension, technical efficiency, which does not impede the achievement of the others. 
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different signs to indicate that a particular dimension – output, input or environment (non-
discretionary) variable – is taken into account (“+ = yes”) or not (“– = no“) according to the 
ideal data, or either if it is considered but not completely (“~ = more or less”). 
INSERT TABLE 15.1 
Undoubtedly among the potential consequences of the reform, transportation quality and 
equity of access are key issues, as well as quality of track and of equipment. However, as we 
show in Table 15.1, none of these dimensions was taken into consideration in the reviewed 
studies. Farsi et al. (2005) estimate cost efficiency of 50 subsidized railways in Switzerland 
using alternative parametric approaches. They show the importance of taking into account 
firms’ heterogeneity in Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). They rely on duality theory and, 
for this purpose, use input prices instead of quantities (“~” in Table 15.1). Friebel et al. (2008) 
estimate technical efficiency and productivity growth of 13 European railways using a Linear 
Structural Relations (LISREL) model. As for the other studies of European national railways 
presented here, data for countries with unbundled systems was previously aggregated across 
all railways companies (infrastructure and operations) operating within a country. Yu and Lin 
(2008) use a multi-activity Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to compute technical 
efficiency and effectiveness of 20 European railways in 2002, including seven Eastern 
European railway.4 Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) estimate economies of scope, for integrated 
vs. unbundled railways companies, using DEA and data of 27 European Railways over the 
period 2000-2004. Asmild et al. (2009) address also the effect of reforms on European 
railways efficiency using a multi-directional DEA approach. This approach allows them to 
compute, separately, staff and material purchases (OPEX less staff expenditures) cost 
efficiency and to compare them across Europe taking into account competition, contestability 
and the companies’ autonomy. Cantos et al. (2010) compute technical efficiency, technical 
change and productivity growth using DEA, while Cantos et al. (2012) compare DEA and 
SFA results. In both cases the authors test the influence of vertical integration vs. unbundled 
railways controlling simultaneously for population density. 
Summing up, none of the studies surveyed here considers outputs and inputs quality 
dimensions. Moreover, none of them control for the potential role on railways outcomes, 
eventually played, by two institutional particular features: price discrimination and 
community service obligations.  
15.2.2 Waste collection  
In most countries around the world, waste collection is a public service whose responsibility 
falls on local authorities, municipalities in the majority of cases. In Table 15.2 we present the 
ideal data that should be considered in the model. On the output side, we expect to find, 
garbage collected in tons and by type, the service coverage and the quality, the scores 
reflecting environment protection (like the percentage of waste recycling), air and water 
                                                
4 The authors make in this way the distinction between railways “efficiency”, measured with outputs corresponding to the 
supplied capacity (seats-km and tons-km supplied) and “effectiveness”, with outputs corresponding to effective demand 
(seats-km and tons-km transported). 
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quality, and depletion of non-renewable resources.5 On the input side, the choice of variables 
will depend on the unit characteristics. For instance, for the firms that manage waste 
collection at the municipal level, it would be possible to use information on physical inputs, 
like labour and equipment, but only if they correspond exactly to the same area for which the 
outputs are observed. Given the increasing organisational complexity of waste collection, that 
implies high specialisation and economies of scale, most municipalities outsource these 
activities. In this case, the input is represented by one variable, the total cost paid by the 
municipality for waste collection and treatment, which includes direct cost plus outsourcing. 
Finally, as for the other analysed public services environmental (non-discretionary) factors 
must be taken into consideration. The distance to landfill and the collection frequency are two 
other variables in relation with the geography and population density. Also the age structure 
and the socio-demographic characteristics of the population must be considered, especially 
when they vary dramatically across municipalities. Moreover, as mentioned before, 
outsourcing is unavoidable in most cases for municipalities, and is therefore potentially a way 
to improve the services offered and to benefit from economies of scale. In the same line of 
reasoning, the way municipalities price waste collection – weight-based, pay-per-bag, poll tax, 
…– may influence waste production behaviour of the population. 
INSERT TABLE 15.2 
In Table 15.2 we survey the dimensions considered by authors in some recent studies selected 
here for illustration purposes. Worthington and Dollery (2001) measure cost efficiency in 
domestic waste management among New South Wales municipalities using DEA. Their study 
has the particularity to work with a large sample and to take into account the recycling rate 
and municipalities’ geographic and demographic dimensions. García-Sánchez (2008) 
analysed the efficiency of waste collection in Spanish municipalities with more than 50,000 
inhabitants which “… are obliged by law to provide the same solid waste services…” (p. 
329).  The author computes DEA efficiencies using output and inputs quantities and in a 
second stage tests the effect of non-discretionary factors, including socio-economic 
dimensions. Marques and Simões (2009) study the effect of incentive regulation on the 
efficiency of 29 Portuguese waste management operators in 2005. For this purpose, they first 
compute a two-output (tons collected and tons recycled) two-input (OPEX and CAPEX) DEA 
model and, in a second stage, analyse the effect of non-discretionary variables, among them 
the institutional framework (private vs. public and regulatory schemes). It is interesting to 
note that the authors report a detailed list of performance indicators, which includes quality of 
service and environmental sustainability. This list is published every year by the regulatory 
agency (Institute for the Regulation of Water and Solid Waste, IRAR), as part of a so-called 
“sunshine” regulation. This kind of information is also part of our ideal data. Unfortunately, 
Marques and Simöes decided to not include them in the analysis, because “…they are defined 
by legislation with high sanctions for non-compliance with laws and regulations” (p. 193).  
Finally, we include in Table 15.2 three recent studies in which the authors study the effect of 
waste-reducing policies on waste collection and treatment costs of near three-hundred 
                                                
5 For a detailed presentation of environmental effects of waste collection and treatment, see Emery et al. (2007). 
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municipalities in Flanders, Belgium. Particularly, these studies make the distinction among 
outputs according to waste types: green, packaging, bulky, residual and EPR (extended 
producer responsibility: batteries, car tires, electrical equipment …). De Jaeger et al. (2011) 
compute a DEA model with total costs as input and then test the effect of demographic and 
socio-economic non-discretionary variables, controlling for institutional differences such as 
weight based pricing, cooperation agreement and outsourcing. Rogge and De Jaeger (2012) 
use slightly similar updated information but rely on a shared input DEA model which allows 
computing partial cost-efficiency for different waste types. Finally, De Jaeger and Rogge 
(2013) compute Malmquist productivity indexes for the period 1998 to 2008. The results 
show that, contrary to expectations, weight-based pricing municipalities did not perform 
worse in terms of cost efficiency than with pay-per-bag system. 
In summary, recent productivity studies on waste collection consider garbage composition, 
total costs paid by municipalities and most non-discretionary dimensions. They generally fail 
to include quality of service and environment sustainability indicators. 
15.2.3 Secondary education 
In Table 15.3, we illustrate what would be the ideal data to study education productivity and, 
for this purpose, we choose secondary education. What are the objectives of the government 
(national or local) on educational matters? It is reasonable to expect high skills in reading 
comprehension, as well as in mathematics, sciences and foreign languages. Given that 
students come from different backgrounds, we do not only need indicators on average scores 
but also scores’ dispersion. Moreover, the capacity to find employment or access to higher 
education, matters too.  
On the input side there are two possible views: physical or financial. The physical inputs are 
number and quality of teachers, administrative staff, the building and other educational 
materials. Alternatively one can look at overall public spending. In such case there are two 
steps embodied: the first step from the financial spending to physical inputs, where inputs 
prices matter, and the second step from inputs to outputs. Therefore, using financial spending 
as input implies, as a potential shortcut, a source of bias in productivity comparisons. Finally, 
the skills acquired by students at the end of primary school would be ideally included as an 
input of secondary education. 
The environmental variables which must be considered vary with the level of aggregation: 
country, district or school. In a within country comparison one has the advantage of dealing 
with the same institutional and cultural setting but a number of other dimensions matter, 
above all the socio-economic environment: income inequality, unemployment, population 
size and density. Also the family background and the peer group characteristics are important. 
In a between-country comparison, it is expected to include institutional variables like: 
political decentralization (schools autonomy), competition of private schools, educational 
system (mobility of students, selectivity, pedagogical techniques …). 
In the literature we find best practice comparisons between countries, between districts within 
a country and between schools, either within or across countries or districts. Most 
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international comparative studies rely on data collected at student level either by the OECD 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) or by the International Association for 
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS).   
In Table 15.3 we present the list of outputs, inputs and environmental variables used in a 
selected number of studies. Afonso and St Aubyn (2006a) use PISA data aggregated by 
country in international comparisons. As expected, given the small number of observations 
(25 countries), the number of variables taken into account is reduced to a strict minimum. 
Sutherland et al. (2009) compare education efficiency in OECD countries using PISA but 
relying on disaggregated data at the school level. This allows them to take into account 
simultaneously the family and socio-economic background, as well as a proxy of capital 
(computer availability). Both studies also report the results of cost-efficiency comparisons at 
the national level using information on educational expenditures. Besides the difficulty to 
estimate accurately the real cost of education, there is evidence from Hanushek (1997) survey 
of near 400 studies on the US education that “there is not a strong or consistent relationship 
between student performance and school resources, at least after variations in family inputs 
are taken into account” (p. 141). This is not surprising given the objectives of welfare states 
concerning education, which are not merely to maximize the average scores and expected 
earnings, but the overall distribution (equity). This is the reason why family background and 
socioeconomic environment play a key role in many studies.  
INSERT TABLE 15.3 
In Table 15.3 we report the variables used by Grosskopf et al. (1997) to compare the 
productivity of 310 educational districts in Texas. For this purpose the authors use a 
parametric indirect distance function approach which considers the scores obtained by 
students in previous levels of education. As inputs, other than school teachers, they consider 
three staff categories: administration, support and teacher aides. Haelermans and De Witte 
(2012) compare 119 schools productivity in the Netherlands looking for the impact of 
educational innovations. They use a nonparametric conditional (order-m) approach which 
allows for controlling schools heterogeneity, mainly localization. Unfortunately, given data 
limitations, school inputs are represented by a unique variable: expenses per student. Finally, 
Wößmann (2003) used probably the largest international data set available, 39 countries and 
more than 260.000 students who participated in the TIMMS study in 1994-95. The author 
estimates an education production function using parametric models, ordinary and weighted 
least squares to identify the main drivers of education performances. We choose this study as 
an illustration that ideal data is not an unattainable goal, at least for input and environmental 
variables. In addition to the ones indicated in Table 15.3, Wößmann (2003) includes several 
variables controlling for teachers’ influence, school responsibility, parents’ role and students’ 
incentives. 
To summarize, all these studies use data on students’ acquired skills and on the number of 
teachers, but only in two cases, Grosskopf et al. (1997) and Wößmann (2003), one uses 
information on output inequality (scores’ dispersion), on teachers’ quality and, even more 
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importantly, on students’ skills at the end of the primary school. Moreover, none of the 
studies in Table 15.3 considers information on the courses followed by the students after high 
school, the degree of employability or the pursuit of higher education. Such information is 
obviously difficult to obtain.    
15.2.4 Health care 
Assuming perfect data availability, we would like to use data reflecting how the patients 
expected lifetime and health status increase as a consequence of health care use. At the same 
time, as indicated in Table 15.4, we would like to consider as output the quality of the care 
delivered. We are not only interested by the efficiency of medical treatment but also by the 
way this is delivered. Using individual data it would be possible to compute for these 
variables average values and inequality indicators (distribution). 
On the input side, we would consider the number and the quality of physicians, nurses and 
hospitals, and how these inputs are distributed among the population and geographical terms. 
Furthermore, total social spending is a potential substitute of physical and qualitative input 
variables when the information on inputs is sparse or not reliable. 
Environmental factors play a crucial role on health care delivered. Other than the age 
structure of the population, individual lifestyle factors like smoking, poor diet or lack of 
physical activity matter. Institutions may also have an important role, e.g. the share of 
prevention in total care expenditures, the importance of the private health sector and the 
private health insurance, co-payment by patients, etc. Our expectation is that most of the 
necessary information might be available, even if not in the exact desired form.  
Before turning to a few recent cross-country comparative studies, the first study in Table 15.4, 
Crémieux et al. (1999), deals with Canadian provinces and is not interested by the 
measurement of productivity, but by the estimation of an average health care production 
function. The reason we choose this study is that it illustrates very well that collecting ideal 
data is not an impossible task, at least for the ten Canadian provinces over the period 1978-
1992. The authors use information on health care outputs and inputs together with detailed 
information on population socio-economic composition and on individuals’ behaviour.  
INSERT TABLE 15.4 
The other studies presented in Table 15.4 deal with cross-country health care data compiled 
either by the World Health Organisation (WHO) or by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Evans et al. (2000) and Tandon et al. (2001) used as 
health outputs, respectively, the “disability-adjusted life expectancy” (DALE) measure and a 
composite measure, which considers five dimensions: DALE, health inequality, 
responsiveness-level, responsiveness-distribution and fair-financing.6  Both studies deal with 
WHO data on 191 countries over the 1993-1997 period and DEA methodology. Two inputs 
are considered: total health expenditure (public plus private) and average educational 
attainment in the adult population.  
                                                
6 For a detailed presentation of these indicators, see Gakidou et al. (2000). 
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The results of these studies, also reported in The World Health Report 2000 (WHO, 2000), 
generated some debate and other studies were undertaken using the same WHO data file.7 
Two of them are included in Table 15.4. First, Greene (2004) estimates stochastic frontiers 
using alternative approaches, which take into account countries’ heterogeneity and several 
environmental (non-discretionary) variables such as income inequality, population density 
and the percentage of health care paid by the government. Second, Lauer et al. (2004) 
estimated health care systems performance assuming five different outputs, in fact, those 
included in the composite output measure used by Tandon et al. (2001) but taken separately. 
The particularity of the DEA approach used by Lauer et al. (2004) is that, rather than 
considering the five different outputs separately, it assumes an identical (equal to 1.0) input 
for all countries. It is the so called benefit of the doubt model introduced by Melyn and 
Moesen (1991) and Lovell et al. (1995), which we adopt in the following section to measure 
the performance of the welfare state in European Union countries. 
Finally, we include in Table 15.4 three other studies, Färe et al. (1997), Afonso and St Aubyn 
(2006b) and Joumard et al. (2008), which used OECD data on health care for industrialized 
countries. Färe et al. (1997) compute Malmquist productivity indexes for 10 countries over 
the period 1974-1989. The outcome of health care is represented by life expectancy of women 
at age 40 and the reciprocal of the infant mortality rate. Inputs are the number of physicians 
and care beds per capita. Afonso and St Aubyn (2006b) computed technical efficiency of 25 
countries in 2002 using the free disposal hull (FDH) approach. In their study the health care 
production function is specified with two outputs, infant survival rate and life expectancy, and 
three inputs, the number of doctors, nurses and beds, respectively. In a recent study, Spinks 
and Hollingsworth (2009) recognized that “the OECD health dataset provides one of the best 
cross-country sources of comparative data available”, however they also underline pitfalls in 
this data, mainly “the lack of an objective measure of quality of life”, like additional quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs), and a “measure of country-based environmental status”. A study 
by Joumard et al. (2008) partially answered these criticisms by including on the input side a 
lifestyle variable and a proxy for the economic, social and cultural status of the population. 
Finally, for reasons now discussed, the level of aggregation of some of these studies is highly 
questionable.   
Summing up, none of the comparative studies of public health care systems surveyed here 
consider all the output-input dimensions of the ideal data. Moreover, when an output or an 
input is included, in most cases the authors are lead to neglect the qualitative and 
distributional dimensions, due to lack of data. And even worse there are the environmental 
(non-discretionary) factors, in particular data on institutional issues like co-payment by 
patients, or the ratio of curative to preventive care, which are not considered.  
 
15.3 The welfare state performance in the EU 
                                                
7 Particularly a paper by Williams (2001)  generated the debate on the performance measurement presented in WHO (2000).  
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In the previous section we have seen that many components of the public sector can be 
submitted to the test of best practices and that such exercise is useful to improve its overall 
efficiency. It is however tempting to try to evaluate the performance of the public sector as a 
whole, neglecting input constraints. In this section we illustrate it by showing estimates of the 
performance of European public sectors. We have chosen to limit our analysis to that of the 
welfare state, which is the most important subset of the public sector. We have two reasons 
for this: the availability of data and a rather good consensus as to the objectives that the 
welfare state is supposed to pursue and according to which its performance can be assessed. 
The objectives of traditional European welfare states are first poverty alleviation and 
inequality reduction and second protection against life cycle risks such as unemployment, ill 
health and lack of education. Recently the European Union has adopted new means of 
governance based on voluntary cooperation that aims at achieving some kind of convergence 
in the field of social inclusion. This approach is known as the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) and it rests on benchmarking and sharing of best practice. Thanks to the OMC, a 
variety of comparable and regularly updated indicators have been developed for the appraisal 
of social protection policies in the twenty-eight European Union country members. The aim is 
to allow countries to know how well they are performing relative to the other countries. 
In this section we focus on five of the most commonly used indicators, which concern poverty, 
inequality, unemployment, education and health. The definitions of the indicators that we use 
are presented in Table 15.5. The first four indicators, poverty (POV), inequality (INE), 
unemployment (UNE) and early school leavers (EDU), are such that we want them as low as 
possible, while life expectancy (EXP) is the only "positive" indicator.8 The five indicators we 
are using here cover the most relevant concerns of a modern welfare state and their choice is 
determined by its objectives.9 They also reflect aspects that people who want to enlarge the 
concept of GDP to better measure social welfare generally take into account, e.g., the classical 
measurable economic welfare (MEW) developed by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), and more 
recently revisited by Stiglitz et al. (2009) and by the OECD (2014).  
INSERT TABLE 15.5 
These indicators for the 28 European Union member states are available for the 8 year period 
from 2005 to 2012. Table 15.6 lists the values for the year 2012.10 As shown in Table 15.6 
countries are not good or bad in all respects and it is difficult to make global comparison. We 
are unable to confidently say that a country is doing better than another country unless all five 
indicators in the country are better than (or equal to) those in the other country. This is 
                                                
8 The data are provided by the EU member states within the OMC (see Eurostat database on Population and Social 
Conditions, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data). They deal with key dimensions of 
individual well-being; and are comparable across countries. It is difficult to find better data for the purpose at hand. This 
being said, we realize that they can be perfected. There is some discontinuity in the series of inequality and poverty 
indicators. In addition, one could argue that life expectancy in good health is likely to be preferred to life expectancy at birth 
or an absolute measure of poverty might be better than a relative measure that is too closely related to income inequality. But 
for the time being, these alternatives do not exist.  
9 The five indicators belong to the series of ten indicators chosen by EU members as representative of economic and social 
policy targets fixed by the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, the so-called “Laeken indicators” (Council of the European Union, 2001). 
10 Coelli et al. (2010) study the performance of social protection in the EU15 over the period 1995-2006. This section can be 
viewed as an extension of this paper, which was coauthored by Lefebvre and Pestieau, two of the authors of this chapter. 
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possible in a few cases, e.g. Austria is doing better than Bulgaria in the five indicators, but it 
is not the norm. To address this issue we wish to obtain a performance index of the welfare 
state, so that we can say which country is actually doing better than the others. This is of 
course not without making choices regarding the methods we shall use and this is the purpose 
of this section.  
INSERT TABLE 15.6 
To obtain one performance index that summarizes the information contained in the five given 
indicators we have to make methodological choices. First the indicators should be converted 
so that they are comparable; this is the case of the indicators where a higher value is bad. 
Second, we should decide of how we aggregate the five indicators retained here. Should we 
use a linear aggregation function (as for the Human Development Index, HDI) or should we 
rely on more sophisticated techniques as presented above? If we use a simple average of the 
five indicators, they need to be scaled so that they are measured with the same unit. Finally, 
we could allocate weights to each of the five indicators in the aggregation process. Should 
these weights vary across indicators? Furthermore should these weights vary across 
countries? And, could they take extreme values, like zero?  
In what follows we address these questions by presenting successively three indexes of the 
performance of the European welfare states. Starting from a simple linear aggregation index, 
we then present two estimations based on best practice frontier techniques. On the one hand, 
the original DEA approach which allows for free choice of output weights, with the only 
condition of non-negativity and, on the other hand, a DEA which allows for imposing 
minimum constraints on the weights assigned to each output.11  
At this point it is important to stress that if we assume that these five indicators as well as the 
aggregate indicator measure the actual outcomes of the welfare state (what we call its 
performance), it would be interesting to also measure the true contribution of social protection 
to that performance and hence to evaluate to what extent the welfare state, with its financial 
and regulatory means, gets close to the best practice frontier. We argue that this exercise, 
which in production theory amounts to the measurement of productive efficiency, is highly 
questionable at this level of aggregation. 
Henceforth when we compare the performance of the welfare state across countries we do not 
intend to explain it by social spending. We realize that many factors may explain differences 
in performance. First the welfare state is not restricted to spending but includes also a battery 
of regulatory measures (minimum wage, tax expenditures, safety rules, etc…) that contribute 
to protect people against lifetime risks and to alleviate poverty. Second contextual factors 
such as family structure, culture and climate, may explain educational or health outcomes as 
much as anything else. This is why we limit our exercise to what we call performance 
assessment and argue against any efficiency/productivity analysis. 
                                                
11 For example, see O’Donnell’s chapter in this volume for details of the DEA method. See also Cherchye et al. (2004) who 
use the DEA in a setting close to this one. 
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15.3.1 Scaling 
The first task is to normalize the five variables in order to make them comparable but also to 
include them in a simple linear aggregation index. Indeed the five indicators listed in Table 
15.5 are measured in different units. In the original Human Development Report (HDR, 1990), 
three composite indicators (health, education and income) are used to derive a Human 
Development Index (HDI). The authors suggest scaling these indicators so that they lie 
between 0 and 1, where the bounds are set to reflect minimum and maximum targets. Thus we 
propose a simple scaling so that the n-th indicator (e.g., life expectancy) of the i-th country 
should be scaled using: 
 , (1) 
so that for each indicator the highest score is 1 and the lowest is 0. For “negative” indicators, 
such as unemployment, where “more is bad”, one alternatively uses: 
  (2) 
so that the country with the lowest rate of unemployment will receive a score of 1 and the one 
with the highest rate of unemployment will receive 0. This is not the only way of scaling 
indicators and the results may be dependent of the chosen method. Coelli et al. (2010) 
compare several scaling methods and show that the results are impacted, although marginally, 
by the approach adopted. 
Table 15.7 shows the five normalized indicators for our sample of 28 countries in 2012. We 
purposely distinguish between the 15 historical members of the EU (hereafter EU15) and the 
13 more recent newcomers (EU13). For normalization purposes we take the minimum and the 
maximum values out of the all sample period 2005-2012 such that these extreme values can 
be observed at different time. Near all the extreme (maximum and minimum) values of the 
five indicators correspond to the years before 2012.  
INSERT TABLE 15.7 
 
15.3.2 Measuring performance 
On the basis of the five scaled indicators, we want to obtain an overall assessment of the 
welfare state performance. One option is to follow the HDI method exposed above and 
calculate the raw arithmetic average of the five indicators. We call it the social protection 
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index: . Table 15.8 reports the indicators as well as the rank of each country in 
2012. As it appears, we have at the top the Nordic countries, plus Austria, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. But we also have new entrants countries (EU13) doing quite well like Slovenia 
or Czech Republic which are at the top. At the bottom, we find Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, 
Romania and Spain. 
However this summation of partial indicators is quite arbitrary and does not completely 
respond to the estimation problems we raised earlier. In particular, there is no reason to grant 
each indicator the same weight. In fact weights could change across indicators and across 
countries to account for the fact that different countries have different priorities. Indeed some 
countries may give more weight to employment than to income equality and other countries 
may give more weight to poverty than to education. One possible solution to this problem is 
to use the DEA approach. As seen in the previous section DEA is traditionally used to 
measure the technical efficiency scores of firms. In the case of the production of social 
protection by a welfare state, we could conceptualise a production process where each country 
is a “firm” which uses government resources to produce social outputs such as reduced 
unemployment and longer life expectancies. We do not follow this path but we will assume 
that each country has one “government” and further one unit of input, and that it produces the 
five outputs discussed above.   
As indicated in the introductory section, this approach is known in the literature as the benefit 
of the doubt weighting approach. It was often applied to compare the performance of 
production units – countries, public services, farms, … – as an alternative composite indicator 
of performance, the one which takes in consideration idiosyncratic units’ behaviour. More 
concretely, the DEA benefit of the doubt scores reported on Table 15.8, called here 
unconstrained DEA, are computed under the assumption that each unit freely chooses the 
most favourable share weights bundle.  
A number of observations can be made from the unconstrained DEA scores and rankings 
reported on Table 15.8.12 First, we note that approximately 30% of the sample receives a DEA 
efficiency score of one (indicating that they are fully efficient). This is not unusual in a DEA 
analysis where the number of dimensions (variables) is large relative to the number of 
observations.  Second, the average DEA score is 0.946 versus the mean SPI score of 0.680. 
The DEA scores tend to be higher because the unlimited freedom to choose outcomes’ weight 
compared with SPI uniform weights assumption. Third, the DEA rankings are “broadly 
similar” to the SPI rankings.  However a few countries do experience dramatic changes, such 
as Italy, Spain and Croatia which are ranked 19, 28 and 23 respectively under SPI but are 
found to be fully efficient in the DEA results.  
  
                                                
12 In order to perform DEA computations we rescaled the five output indicators between 0.1 and 1.0, instead of 0.0 to 1.0. 
The main reason is to avoid zero outputs and then allow constrained share weights DEA computations. The DEA efficiency 
scores reported here do not take into account slacks; therefore they are invariant to this simple units measurement change in 
scaling, as it has been proved by Lovell and Pastor (1995).  
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INSERT TABLE 15.8 
There are two primary reasons why we observe differences between the rankings in DEA 
versus the SPI. First, the SPI allocates an equal weight of 1/5 to each indicator while in the 
DEA method the weights used can vary across the five indicators. They are determined by the 
slope of the production possibility frontier that is constructed using the linear programming 
methods. Second, the implicit weights (or shadow prices) in DEA can also vary from country 
to country because the slope of the frontier can differ for different output (indicator) mixes.  
We use the shadow price information from the dual DEA linear programming to obtain the 
implicit weights assigned to each country indicator. These weights and their means are given 
on Table 15.9. The first thing we note is that the poverty (POV) and inequality (INE) 
indicators are given, in average for the whole sample EU28, a fairly small weight, while life 
expectancy (EXP) and education (EDU) indicators are given a weight much larger than 0.3. 
These results suggest that the uniform weights of 0.2 (used in the SPI) understate the effort 
needed to improve health and education outcomes versus reducing inequality and poverty. 
Nevertheless, when we observe more in details the results for EU15 and EU13, we remark 
that huge differences appear. Several EU15 members, mainly Italy, Portugal and Spain, assign 
the highest weight (higher than 0.9) to life expectancy, while several EU13 countries, among 
them Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania, do the same with education. In each case, these countries 
take advantage of their outstanding performances in these respective domains (see Tables 
15.6 and 15.7). 
INSERT TABLE 15.9 
Summing up, SPI and unconstrained DEA correspond to two aggregation techniques. Many 
attempts have then been made in the DEA literature to improve the implicit weighting 
procedure. They mainly consist in the inclusion of additional weight restrictions on the DEA 
linear program or, in other words, in restricting implicit rates of substitution (transformation) 
between outputs. Allen et al. (1997) and Cherchye et al. (2007a) summarized the approaches 
proposed in the literature, which in most cases rely on the role of experts’ value judgements.13 
An interesting illustration of the use of experts’ judgements in a benefit of the doubt DEA 
setting is the study on health performances of 191 World Health Organisation countries 
members by Lauer et al. (2004), mentioned above. In the case analysed here, the performance 
of EU welfare states, unfortunately we do not have access to experts’ value judgements. 
Hence we decided to adopt the same weight restriction for our five indicators. We now 
present the DEA results obtained assuming equal minimum weights thresholds. For 
illustration purposes, we choose a minimum threshold of 0.10 for each one the five outcomes 
indicators which by construction implies a maximum weight threshold of 0.60 for each of 
them.  
 
                                                
13 There are however some exceptions. For instance, Anderson et al. (2011) introduce a benefit of the doubt index which by 
construction will be bounded in both sides with only relying on two assumptions: non-decreasing and quasi-concave with 
respect to indicators; also Reig-Martínez et al. (2011) and Reig-Martínez (2013) apply a benefit of the doubt index in 
combination with a Multi Criteria Decision Method (DEA-MCDM) which allows building a full rank of all observations in 
the sample, included the most efficient. 
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The results reported in the last columns of Table 15.8 were obtained imposing absolute 
weight restrictions.14 That is, instead of imposing restrictions on shadow prices, these are 
imposed on indicators’ virtual proportions (Wong and Beasley (1990)). More concretely, each 
output is assumed to have a weight not lower than 0.10, as indicated before.  
Clearly the DEA scores obtained under weight restrictions are either equal or lower than those 
obtained under unconstrained DEA (Pedraja-Chaparro et al. (1997)).  On Table 15.8 we 
observe that four countries, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden, keep 
their position on the frontier in 2012, while several others suffer of sharp performance drop, 
accompanied in some cases by dramatic loss in rank position, like Croatia, Greece, Italy or 
Spain. Finally, many other countries, including Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark and Germany, 
improved dramatically their rank even if their performance diminished in absolute terms.  
Average constrained DEA scores (0.843) are, as expected, located between unconstrained 
DEA (0.946) and SPI (0.680) scores, but closer to the former. On the contrary, individual 
countries’ performances are highly correlated between constrained DEA and SPI (0.982 
Spearman correlation) when compared with correlation between constrained and 
unconstrained DEA (0.606 Spearman correlation).  
A look at the detailed weights obtained under constrained DEA in Table 15.10 shows that for 
a majority of countries and indicators the minimum weight constraints (0.10) are binding in 
2012. Moreover, for more than half of countries one of the indicators reaches the maximum 
potential weight, 0.60, while the four others receive the minimum weight threshold. If we 
compare the average weights for the EU15, EU13 and EU28 in Tables 15.9 and 15.10, it 
appears that in most cases the weights computed under unconstrained and constrained DEA 
are very close, with life expectancy (EXP) highly weighted by former European Union 
members (EU15) and education (EDU) by the new EU13 entrants. The only exceptions are 
the POV (at-risk-of-poverty-rate) indicator, whose weight doubles from 0.060 to 0.120 for 
EU28 and the EXP indicator, whose weight increases from 0.089 to 0.169 for EU13. 
INSERT TABLE 15.10 
15.3.3 Welfare performance dynamics and convergence 
The data we used in the previous sections is available for EU27 since 2005, thus it is 
interesting to see whether we observe specific trends and particularly convergence towards 
welfare state performance among the EU countries, the aim of the OMC strategy. For this 
purpose, we compute year by year performance indexes – SPI and constrained DEA – and 
their rate of change using the 2005-2012 normalized indicators. In the case of SPI its rate of 
change (SPIC) corresponds to performance growth, while for the DEA score it represents 
changes in distances to the frontier (relative performance) over time. In order to estimate 
performance growth in the case of the DEA indicator, we compute Malmquist decomposable 
indexes of performance change (PC), following Cherchye et al (2007b). These indexes are the 
sum of two components: the change in relative performance, known as the catching-up (CU) 
                                                
14  For a survey of weight restriction in DEA, see Pedraja-Chaparro et al. (1997), and for a survey on weight restriction in a 
DEA benefit of the doubt context, see Cherchye et al. (2007a). 
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component and the change at the frontier level themselves, labelled as the environmental 
change (EC) component by Cherchye et al (2007b).15   
The results by year and by country are reported in Tables 15.11 and 15.12, respectively. It is 
interesting to note that for both the SPI and the constrained DEA, the average rate of 
performance change for the EU28 over the whole period, is positive and similar, 0.5% for 
SPIC and 0.4% for PC. In other words, welfare state performances increased half percentage 
point every year in average over the 2005-2012 period. Moreover, looking in details at Table 
15.11, we observe that SPIC and PC growth rates are in most cases worst after the crisis than 
before: null and negative growth rates are only observed from 2008-2009 on. Otherwise, 
several differences appear in the results across methods and between EU15 and EU13 
members’ states. For instance, EU15 performed less well than EU13 members, in average, 
both under SPIC (-0.1% vs. 1.2%) and constrained DEA (0.2% vs. 0.6%). When we analyse 
the components of performance change, catching-up (CU) and environmental change (EC), a 
clear case appears for EU13 with a positive catching-up growth rate (CU=1.9%) with a 
simultaneous decrease at the frontier level, EC=-1.3% in average for the whole period.  
     INSERT TABLE 15.11 
To be complete, Table 15.12 reports the results by country. For several countries both 
methodologies give similar results, for some of them positive SPIC and PC, e.g. Belgium, 
Portugal and Slovenia, for other negative, e.g. Denmark and Bulgaria. Only France presents 
results of opposite sign, with a negative performance rate of change under SPI, but positive 
under constrained DEA. Overall the correlation between both indicators is high (0.964 
Pearson correlation).  
     INSERT TABLE 15.12 
To test convergence in performance among EU countries we perform two different tests 
following Lichtenberg (1994). First, we test the mean-reversion hypothesis, that is the 
hypothesis that countries with the lowest level of performance at period t-1 growth at a 
highest rate in period t. For this purpose we run a simple OLS model with the logarithm of the 
performance score change in time t as dependent variable and as explanatory variable the 
performance score at time t – 1. This test is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
convergence; therefore we run the test of convergence suggested by Lichtenberg (1994). The 
results of these tests applied to the performance scores changes (SPIC, PC and CU) are 
reported in Table 15.13. 
Looking first at the results corresponding to the change in performance scores SPIC and PC, 
we observe that the mean-reversion hypothesis is verified for the two indicators. In both cases 
the coefficient β associated with lagged performance has a negative and statistically 
significant value. Moreover β takes a similar absolute value, -0.037 and -0.042 for the SPI and 
                                                
15 This component represents the technological progress in the productivity measurement literature (Färe et al. (1994)). In the 
performance measurement framework, Cherchye et al. (2007b) postulate that this component “reflects a more favourable 
policy environment” (p.770).  
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constrained DEA, respectively. In other words, countries with the lowest performance score 
improved their welfare state performance faster.  
The test for convergence is straightforward. It is simply based on the ratio !! 1+ ! ! 
computed using the OLS estimated parameters.16 As demonstrated by Lichtenberg (1994), 
this ratio is equivalent to a test on the ratio of variances between periods, the variance in t-1 
over the variance in t. For convergence, the expected result is that this ratio must be higher 
and significantly different from 1.0. The results reported in Table 15.1 are in both cases 
slightly higher than 1.0 (SPI=1.005 and constrained DEA=1.036) but none of them 
significantly different from 1.0. 
 
The second section of Table 15.13 reports the results of mean-reversion hypothesis and 
convergence test for the catching-up effects (CU) computed under constrained DEA . As for 
performance growth the mean-reversion hypothesis is verified. The β coefficient is negative 
and statistically different from zero. The test on ratio !! 1+ ! ! shows higher values than 
for PC (1.054), but not sufficiently to validate convergence.  
 
Finally, at the bottom of Table 15.13 are reported the results of a test of unequal variances 
between performance scores in 2005 and 2012. The ratio, in logarithmic form, indicates a 
value higher than 1.0 for constrained DEA (1.39). As expected, performance variance 
declines among the EU28 countries. However, it was not enough to pass the convergence test. 
In this case, as well as for the ratio of variances corresponding to SPIC (1.01), these values 
are statistically non-significant.   
       
INSERT TABLE 15.13 
Summing up, the results reported here confirm the observations made in Table 15.8. We do 
not observe convergence in performance among the countries unlike Coelli et al (2010). There 
are mainly two reasons. The first one comes from the fact that the sample we use is much 
more limited in terms of time: 2005 to 2012 vs. 1995 to 2006. A second reason to this result is 
the economic crisis that started in 2007 and had direct consequences on social protection 
budgets in many countries.  
15.3.4 Measuring efficiency with or without inputs 
Finally, if we would like to compare these results with those presented in traditional measures 
of production efficiency of public services or public utilities from Section 15.2, we should 
gather data on both outputs and inputs to construct a best practice frontier. We showed above 
that even though it is difficult to meet the ideal data requirement, this approach is very useful 
and could be used when at least sufficient data are available and there exists an underlying 
identified technology. For example, measuring the efficiency of railways companies with this 
                                                
16 To perform this test the !! corresponds to the OLS model with !"# !"# ! !as dependent variable and !"# !"# ! − 1 !as explanatory variable. By construction, the β coefficient and the other results are identical. 
 
19 
approach makes sense. Railways transport people and commodities (hopefully with comfort 
and punctuality) using a certain number of identifiable inputs. 
When dealing with the public sector as a whole and more particularly social protection, we 
can easily identify its missions: social inclusion in terms of housing, education, health, work 
and consumption. Yet, it is difficult to relate indicators pertaining to these missions (e.g., our 
five indicators) to specific inputs. A number of studies use social spending as the only input, 
but one has to realize that for most indicators of inclusion, social spending explains little. For 
example, it is well known that, for health and education, factors such as diet and family 
support are often just as important as public spending. This does not mean that public 
spending in health and in education is worth nothing; it just means that it is part of a complex 
process in which other factors play a crucial and complementary role.  
Another reason why using social spending as the input of our 5 indicators is not appropriate 
comes from the fact that social spending as measured by international organisations is not a 
good measure of real spending. It does not include subsidies and tax breaks awarded to 
schemes such as mandatory private pensions or health care and it includes taxes paid on social 
transfers.17 
All this does not mean that the financing side of the public sector does not matter. It is always 
important to make sure that wastes are minimized, but wastes cannot be measured at such an 
aggregate level. It is difficult to think of a well-defined technology, which “produces” social 
indicators with given inputs. To evaluate the efficiency slacks of the public sector, it is 
desirable to analyse micro-components of the welfare states such as schools, hospitals, public 
agencies, public institution, railways, etc. such as the studies we presented in the previous 
section. At the macro level, one should stop short of measuring technical inefficiency and 
restrict oneself to performance ranking. 
To use the analogy of a classroom, it makes sense to rank students according to how they 
perform in a series of exams. Admittedly we can question the quality of tests or the weights 
used in adding marks from different fields. Yet in general there is little discussion as to the 
grading of students. At the same time we know that these students may face different 
“environmental conditions” which can affect their ability to perform. For example, if we have 
two students ranked number 1 and 2 and if the latter is forced to work at night to help ailing 
parents or to commute a long way from home, it is possible that he can be considered as more 
deserving or meritorious than the number 1 whose material and family conditions are ideal. 
This being said there exists no ranking of students according to merit. The concept of “merit” 
is indeed too controversial. By the same token, we should not attempt to assess the “merit” of 
social protection systems or the public sector as a whole. 
 
 
                                                
17 See Adema et al. (2011) for the definition of gross and net social spending. 
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15.4 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to present some guidelines as to the question of measuring 
and assessing the performance of the public sector. We believe that such measurement is 
unavoidable for two reasons. First, people constantly question the role of the public sector as 
a whole or of its components on the basis of questionable indicators. Second, a good measure 
can induce governments or public firms that are not performing to get closer to the best 
practice frontier.  
We start with the issue of whether or not we have to limit ourselves to a simple performance 
comparison or we can conduct an efficiency study. We argue that efficiency evaluations can 
be conducted for components of the public sector when sufficient data are available and there 
exists a production technology link between resources used and outcomes achieved. When 
dealing with the overall welfare state or large aggregates such as the health or the education 
sector we deliberately restrict ourselves to performance comparisons, that is, comparisons 
based only on the outcomes of these sectors. The reason is simple: in those instances, the link 
between public spending and outcomes is not clear and does not reveal a clear-cut production 
technology. More concretely, key factors that can affect performance are missing. For 
example, diet can impact health and family can influence education and yet it is difficult to 
quantify the roles of diet and of family. 
We present an overview of recent productive efficiency studies in four areas: railways, waste 
collection, schools and hospitals. For each of these areas we contrast what we call the ideal set 
of data with the one that is actually used by researchers. No surprisingly the qualitative data 
are consistently missing. This weakens the recommendations that can be drawn from these 
studies and should induce public authorities to further invest in qualitative data collection. 
We then turn to the assessment of the performance of 28 European Union country members. 
The fact that even with a synthetic measure of performance the Nordic countries lead the pack 
is not surprising. It is neither surprising to see that some Mediterranean countries, Greece and 
Portugal, and most new entrants (EU13) are not doing well. It is interesting to see that with 
such a comprehensive concept Anglo-Saxon welfare states, Ireland and UK, do as well as the 
Continental welfare states such as Belgium and Germany, and that Czech Republic and 
Slovenia are among the best performers. 
Finally we turned to the convergence issue. Contrary to Coelli et al. (2010), we did not find a 
clear-cut process of convergence. This can be explained by the fact that here we deal with 
EU28 and not just EU15 and that the period is not only much shorter but also includes crisis 
years. It will be interesting to redo this exercise in several years when a longer time series is 
available. 
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Table 15.1: Measures of productivity in railways activity 
 Ideal data (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Outputs Passenger kilometres + + + + + + + 
 Trains comfort and punctuality – – – – – – – 
 Freight tons and kilometres (bulk, containers, …) + + + + + + + 
 Delivery quality and punctuality – – – – – – – 
 Equity of access – – – – – – – 
 Passenger per seat – – + – – + + 
Inputs Labour (disaggregated) ~ + + + ~ + + 
 Equipment (disaggregated by type)  ~ – + + ~ + + 
 Quality of equipment – – – – – – – 
 Tracks (length) + + + + + + + 
 Quality of tracks – – – – – – – 
 Energy (sources) ~ – – – ~ – – 
Environment Geography, stage length  – – + – – + + 
 Autonomy – – – – + – – 
 Competition or contestability – + – + + + + 
 Price discrimination – – – – – – – 
 Community service obligation – – – – – – – 
Observations Large number companies (countries) 50 12 20 27 23 16 23 
 Long period (years) 13 23 1 5 7 20 8 
Note: + = yes; ~ = more or less; – = unavailable. 
Recent studies: (i) Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2005); (ii) Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2008); (iii) Yu and Lin (2008); (iv) Growitsch and 
Wetzel (2009); (v) Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard and Kronborg (2009); (vi) Cantos, Pastor and Serrano (2010) and (vii) Cantos, Pastor and 
Serrano (2012).  
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Table 15.2: Measures of productivity in waste collection 
 Ideal data (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Outputs Garbage collected (types and quantities) ~ ~ + + + + 
 Recycling rate + – + – – – 
 Service coverage and quality ~ – – – – – 
 Environment (air and water quality) – – – – – – 
Inputs Labour – + – – – – 
 Equipment (disaggregated by type)  – + – – – – 
 Cost (OPEX and CAPEX) + – + + + + 
Environment Geography (distance landfill, frequency delivery) + ~ + – – – 
 Demography (population density, age) + + + + + – 
 Socio-economic characteristics – + + + + – 
 Public-private delivery, outsourcing – – + + – – 
 Pricing (weight-based, pay-per-bag, …) – – – + + + 
Observations Large number of municipalities (operators) 103 113 29 299 293 272 
 Long period (years) 1 1 1 1 1 11 
Note: + = yes; ~ = more or less; – = unavailable. 
Recent studies: (i) Worthington and Dollery (2001); (ii) García-Sánchez (2008); (iii) Marques and Simões (2009);  
(iv) De Jaeger et al. (2011); (v) Rogge and De Jaeger (2013); (iv) De Jaeger and Rogge (2013). 
 
 
 
  
27 
Table 15.3: Measures of productivity in education, at the secondary level 
Ideal data (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Outputs Acquired skills : reading, maths, science + + + + + 
                : foreign languages – – – + – 
 Scores’ dispersion – – + – + 
 Direct employability – – – – – 
 Indirect employability (through college) – – – – – 
Inputs Teachers : number + + + ~ + 
                : quality (skills) – – + – + 
 Administrative staff – – + ~ + 
 Building, equipment – ~ – ~ + 
 Skills at the end of the primary education – – + – + 
Environment Autonomy / Responsibility – – – – + 
 Spatial distribution of schools – – – + + 
 Socio-economic characteristics – + + – + 
 Family background  + ~ – – + 
 Unemployment rate, economic growth ~ – – ~ + 
 Pedagogical techniques or innovations – – – + + 
Observations Large number of units : countries, districts 25 29 310  39 
                                      : schools    119 n.r. 
 Long period (years) 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes: + = yes; ~ = more or less; – = unavailable; n.r.=not reported. 
Recent studies: (i) Afonso and St Aubyn (2006); (ii) Sutherland, Price and Gonand (2009); (iii) Grosskopf, Hayes, 
Taylor and Weber (1997); iv) Haelermans and De Witte (2012); v) Wößmann (2003). 
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Table 15.4: Measures of productivity in  health care public systems 
Ideal data (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Outputs Incremental life time (average, distribution) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
 Incremental health status (average, distribution) ~ – ~ ~ ~ – – – 
 Quality of care (average, distribution) – – ~ ~ ~ – – – 
Inputs Physicians (speciality, quality, distribution) ~ – – – – ~ ~ – 
 Nurses (speciality, quality, distribution) – – – – – – ~ – 
 Hospitals (speciality, quality, distribution) – – – – – ~ ~ – 
 Social expenditure (public and private) + ~ ~ ~ – – – ~ 
Environment Age structure, population density + – – ~ – – – – 
 Socio-economic characteristics + ~ ~ ~ – – – + 
 Individual lifestyle: physical exercise, diet … + – – – – – – + 
 Ratio of curative to preventive care – – – – – – – – 
 Role of the private sector  – – – + – – – – 
 Co-payment by patients, private insurance ~ – – – – – – – 
Observations Large number of units : countries, provinces 10 191 191 191 191 10 24 30 
 Long period (years) 15 5 5 5 5 15 1 1 
Notes: + = yes; ~ = more or less; – = unavailable; n.r.=not reported. 
Recent studies: (i) Crémieux, Ouellette and Pilon (1999); (ii) Evans, Tandon, Murray and Lauer (2000); iii) Tandon, 
Murray, Lauer and Evans (2001); (iv) Greene (2004); (v) Lauer, Lovell, Murray and Evans (2004); (vi) Färe, 
Grosskopf, Lindgren and Poullier (1997); (vii) Afonso and St Aubyn (2006b); (viii) Joumard, André, Nicq and Chatal 
(2008).  
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Table 15.5: Indicators of Social Protection  
Definition 
  
POV : At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers as defined as the share of persons with 
an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set 
at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social 
transfers). 
INE : Inequality of income distribution as defined as the ratio of total income received by 
the 20% of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by 
the 20% of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). Income must 
be understood as equivalised disposable income. 
UNE : Long term unemployed (12 months or longer) as a share of the total active 
population harmonised with national monthly unemployment estimates. 
EXP : Life expectancy as the number of years a person may be expected to live, starting 
at age 0. 
EDU : Early school leavers as the percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most 
lower secondary education and not in further education or training. 
Source: The five indicators are taken from the Eurostat Database on Population and Social Conditions 
(2014). 
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Table 15.6: Indicators of social protection, 2012 
Region and Country POV INE UNE EXP EDU 
EU15  15.9 4.8 4.7 81.2 12.1 
Austria AT 14.4 4.2 1.1 81.1 7.6 
Belgium BE 15.0 3.9 3.4 80.5 12.0 
Denmark DK 13.1 4.5 2.1 80.2 9.1 
Finland FI 13.2 3.7 1.6 80.7 8.9 
France FR 14.1 4.5 4.1 82.1 11.6 
Germany DE 16.1 4.3 2.5 81.0 10.6 
Greece EL 23.1 6.6 14.4 80.7 11.4 
Ireland IE 15.2 4.5 9.1 80.9 9.7 
Italy IT 19.4 5.5 5.7 82.4 17.6 
Luxembourg LU 15.1 4.1 1.6 81.5 8.1 
The Netherlands NL 10.1 3.6 1.8 81.2 8.8 
Portugal PT 17.9 5.8 7.7 80.6 20.8 
Spain ES 22.2 7.2 11.1 82.5 24.9 
Sweden SE 14.1 3.7 1.5 81.8 7.5 
United Kingdom UK 16.2 5.4 2.7 81.0 13.6 
 EU 13  16.7 4.9 5.6 76.9 9.9 
Bulgaria BG 21.2 6.1 6.8 74.4 12.5 
Croatia HR 20.5 5.4 10.3 77.3 4.2 
Cyprus CY 14.7 4.7 3.6 81.1 11.4 
Czech Republic CZ 9.6 3.5 3.0 78.1 5.5 
Estonia EE 17.5 5.4 5.5 76.7 10.5 
Hungary HU 14.0 4.0 4.9 75.3 11.5 
Latvia LV 19.2 6.5 7.8 74.1 10.6 
Lithuania LT 18.6 5.3 6.6 74.1 6.5 
Malta MT 15.1 3.9 3.0 80.9 22.6 
Poland PL 17.1 4.9 4.1 76.9 5.7 
Romania RO 22.6 6.3 3.2 74.5 17.4 
Slovakia SK 13.2 3.7 9.4 76.3 5.3 
Slovenia SI 13.5 3.4 4.3 80.3 4.4 
EU28  16.3 4.8 5.1 79.2 11.1 
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Table 15.7: Normalized indicators – EU 28, 2012 
Region and Country POV INE UNE EXP EDU 
EU15  0.587 0.659 0.698 0.884 0.761 
Austria AT 0.674 0.783 0.957 0.875 0.890 
Belgium BE 0.640 0.848 0.791 0.825 0.766 
Denmark DK 0.747 0.717 0.885 0.800 0.847 
Finland FI 0.742 0.891 0.921 0.842 0.853 
France FR 0.691 0.717 0.741 0.958 0.777 
Germany DE 0.579 0.761 0.856 0.867 0.805 
Greece EL 0.185 0.261 0.000 0.842 0.782 
Ireland IE 0.629 0.717 0.381 0.858 0.831 
Italy IT 0.393 0.500 0.626 0.983 0.607 
Luxembourg LU 0.635 0.804 0.921 0.908 0.876 
The Netherlands NL 0.916 0.913 0.906 0.883 0.856 
Portugal PT 0.478 0.435 0.482 0.833 0.517 
Spain ES 0.236 0.130 0.237 0.992 0.401 
Sweden SE 0.691 0.891 0.928 0.933 0.893 
United Kingdom UK 0.573 0.522 0.842 0.867 0.720 
EU13  0.546 0.640 0.635 0.527 0.826 
Bulgaria BG 0.292 0.370 0.547 0.317 0.751 
Croatia HR 0.331 0.522 0.295 0.558 0.986 
Cyprus CY 0.657 0.674 0.777 0.875 0.782 
Czech Republic CZ 0.944 0.935 0.820 0.625 0.949 
Estonia EE 0.500 0.522 0.640 0.508 0.808 
Hungary HU 0.697 0.826 0.683 0.392 0.780 
Latvia LV 0.404 0.283 0.475 0.292 0.805 
Lithuania LT 0.438 0.543 0.561 0.292 0.921 
Malta MT 0.635 0.848 0.820 0.858 0.466 
Poland PL 0.522 0.630 0.741 0.525 0.944 
Romania RO 0.213 0.326 0.806 0.325 0.613 
Slovakia SK 0.742 0.891 0.360 0.475 0.955 
Slovenia SI 0.725 0.957 0.727 0.808 0.980 
EU28  0.568 0.651 0.669 0.718 0.791 
Note: Normalized within the 0 to 1.0 scale over the entire period (2005-2012) 
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Table 15.8: SPI and DEA performance index – EU 28, 2012 
Region and Country 
SPI Unconstrained  DEA 
Constrained  
DEA 
Index Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
EU15  0.718 - 0.964 - 0.866 - 
Austria AT 0.836 6 1.000 1 0.986 5 
Belgium BE 0.774 10 0.935 19 0.905 12 
Denmark DK 0.799 8 0.961 14 0.942 9 
Finland FI 0.850 4 0.997 10 0.981 6 
France FR 0.777 9 1.000 1 0.960 8 
Germany DE 0.773 11 0.935 19 0.918 10 
Greece EL 0.414 27 0.908 22 0.440 28 
Ireland IE 0.683 16 0.934 20 0.841 17 
Italy IT 0.622 19 1.000 1 0.841 17 
Luxembourg LU 0.829 7 0.987 11 0.969 7 
The Netherlands NL 0.895 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Portugal PT 0.549 22 0.874 24 0.758 22 
Spain ES 0.399 28 1.000 1 0.574 27 
Sweden SE 0.867 2 1.000 1 1.000 1 
United Kingdom UK 0.705 14 0.933 21 0.872 15 
EU13  0.635 - 0.924  0.816 - 
Bulgaria BG 0.455 25 0.790 28 0.653 25 
Croatia HR 0.538 23 1.000 1 0.756 23 
Cyprus CY 0.753 12 0.938 17 0.912 11 
Czech Republic CZ 0.855 3 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Estonia EE 0.596 20 0.853 26 0.784 20 
Hungary HU 0.675 17 0.889 23 0.823 19 
Latvia LV 0.452 26 0.838 27 0.658 24 
Lithuania LT 0.551 21 0.944 16 0.767 21 
Malta MT 0.725 13 0.947 15 0.877 14 
Poland PL 0.672 18 0.977 13 0.879 13 
Romania RO 0.457 24 0.859 25 0.634 26 
Slovakia SK 0.684 15 0.981 12 0.864 16 
Slovenia SI 0.839 5 1.000 1 1.000 1 
EU28  0.680 - 0.946 - 0.843 - 
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Table 15.9: Weights by country – Unconstrained DEA - EU28, 2012 
Region and Country POV INE UNE EXP EDU 
EU15  0.080 0.073 0.235 0.519 0.093 
Austria AT 0.013 0.015 0.845 0.054 0.073 
Belgium BE 0.000 0.663 0.000 0.337 0.000 
Denmark DK 0.135 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.384 
Finland FI 0.045 0.189 0.766 0.000 0.000 
France FR 0.120 0.005 0.004 0.856 0.015 
Germany DE 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.859 0.000 
Greece EL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.832 0.168 
Ireland IE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.419 0.581 
Italy IT 0.003 0.021 0.028 0.918 0.031 
Luxembourg LU 0.000 0.000 0.672 0.328 0.000 
The Netherlands NL 0.798 0.001 0.066 0.083 0.052 
Portugal PT 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.950 0.000 
Spain ES 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.995 0.002 
Sweden SE 0.028 0.201 0.383 0.295 0.093 
United Kingdom UK 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.861 0.000 
EU13  0.038 0.154 0.132 0.089 0.587 
Bulgaria BG 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.990 
Croatia HR 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.992 
Cyprus CY 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.716 0.140 
Czech Republic CZ 0.235 0.024 0.051 0.042 0.648 
Estonia EE 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.786 
Hungary HU 0.000 0.835 0.165 0.000 0.000 
Latvia LV 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.992 
Lithuania LT 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.992 
Malta MT 0.000 0.655 0.000 0.345 0.000 
Poland PL 0.000 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.788 
Romania RO 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Slovakia SK 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.898 
Slovenia SI 0.007 0.488 0.045 0.056 0.405 
EU28  0.060 0.111 0.187 0.320 0.322 
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Table 15.10: Outcomes’ weights by country - Constrained DEA - EU28, 2012 
Region and Country POV INE UNE EXP EDU 
EU15  0.123 0.106 0.186 0.427 0.158 
Austria AT 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 0.100 
Belgium BE 0.100 0.185 0.100 0.515 0.100 
Denmark DK 0.100 0.100 0.248 0.100 0.452 
Finland FI 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 0.100 
France FR 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 
Germany DE 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 
Greece EL 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 
Ireland IE 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.165 0.535 
Italy IT 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 
Luxembourg LU 0.100 0.100 0.197 0.503 0.100 
The Netherlands NL 0.450 0.102 0.141 0.157 0.151 
Portugal PT 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 
Spain ES 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 
Sweden SE 0.101 0.104 0.108 0.562 0.125 
United Kingdom UK 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 
EU13  0.115 0.138 0.144 0.169 0.434 
Bulgaria BG 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 
Croatia HR 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 
Cyprus CY 0.114 0.100 0.100 0.586 0.100 
Czech Republic CZ 0.261 0.103 0.108 0.103 0.425 
Estonia EE 0.100 0.100 0.132 0.100 0.568 
Hungary HU 0.100 0.392 0.100 0.100 0.308 
Latvia LV 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 
Lithuania LT 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 
Malta MT 0.100 0.197 0.100 0.503 0.100 
Poland PL 0.100 0.100 0.128 0.100 0.572 
Romania RO 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.100 0.100 
Slovakia SK 0.118 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.582 
Slovenia SI 0.104 0.196 0.102 0.108 0.489 
EU28  0.120 0.121 0.167 0.307 0.286 
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Table 15.11: Dynamic performance change   
Country SPIC (%) 
Constrained DEA 
CU  
(%) 
EC 
(%) 
PC 
(%) 
EU15 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
2005-2006 1.2 2.4 -1.5 0.9 
2006-2007 1.3 -1.0 2.1 1.1 
2007-2008 1.2 2.3 -1.7 0.6 
2008-2009 0.1 2.0 -1.6 0.4 
2009-2010 -1.2 -1.2 1.2 0.0 
2011-2012 -2.4 -3.6 2.2 -1.5 
EU13 1.2 1.9 -1.3 0.6 
2005-2006 1.6 0.7 -0.6 0.1 
2006-2007 3.4 -0.9 2.8 1.8 
2007-2008 3.3 7.9 -5.4 2.1 
2008-2009 0.4 0.9 -0.9 0.0 
2009-2010 -2.4 1.7 -1.9 -0.2 
2010-2011 0.9 1.8 -1.7 0.1 
2011-2012 1.2 1.3 -0.9 0.3 
EU28 0.5 1.0 -0.5 0.4 
2005-2006 1.4 1.6 -1.1 0.5 
2006-2007 2.3 -0.9 2.4 1.4 
2007-2008 2.2 4.9 -3.4 1.3 
2008-2009 0.2 1.5 -1.3 0.2 
2009-2010 -1.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
2010-2011 0.1 1.0 -0.9 0.1 
2011-2012 -0.8 -1.4 0.8 -0.6 
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Table 15.12: Performance change by country (2005-2012 mean)  
Country SPIC (%) 
Constrained DEA 
CU  
(%) 
EC 
(%) 
PC 
(%) 
EU15  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Austria AT -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Belgium BE 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.7 
Denmark DK -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -0.8 
Finland FI 0.4 0.4 -0.3 0.1 
France FR -0.1 0.6 0.2 0.8 
Germany DE 0.5 0.8 -0.1 0.7 
Greece EL -4.9 -7.4 5.6 -2.3 
Ireland IE 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 
Italy IT 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.9 
Luxembourg LU 0.5 0.5 -0.3 0.1 
The Netherlands NL 1.4 1.2 -0.5 0.7 
Portugal PT 5.0 7.9 -4.1 3.4 
Spain ES -4.6 -3.1 2.5 -0.6 
Sweden SE -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 
United Kingdom UK 1.0 1.0 -0.9 0.1 
EU13  1.2 1.9 -1.3 0.6 
Bulgaria BG -3.3 -1.0 -0.8 -1.7 
Croatia HR -1.5 -1.4 0.9 -0.6 
Cyprus CY 0.9 0.6 -0.5 0.1 
Czech Republic CZ 1.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 
Estonia EE 2.4 2.2 -1.1 1.1 
Hungary HU 0.3 1.0 -0.6 0.3 
Latvia LV 1.3 5.3 -3.6 1.5 
Lithuania LT 3.3 5.2 -3.4 1.7 
Malta MT 1.6 2.6 -1.0 1.5 
Poland PL 6.2 4.1 -2.0 2.1 
Romania RO 0.9 3.4 -3.2 0.0 
Slovakia SK 1.9 2.3 -1.3 1.0 
Slovenia SI 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 
EU28  0.5 1.0 -0.5 0.4 
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Table 15.13: Mean-reversion hypothesis and convergence test   
Variables and tests SPI Constrained  DEA 
Performance change 
OLS model – Mean-reversion hypothesis 
Dependent variable !"# !"#$ !  !"# !" !  
Explanatory variable   !"# !"# ! − 1 !              (β) -0.042* - 
        (std) (0.020)  !"# !"# ! − 1 !               (β) - -0.037* 
        (std)  (0.016) !! 0.922 0.975 
Test of convergence !! 1 + ! !  (F-test) 1.005 (n-s) 1.036 (n-s) 
Catching-up  
OLS model – Mean-reversion hypothesis 
Dependent variable - !"# !" !  
Explanatory variable   !"# !"# ! − 1                 (β) - -0.101** 
        (std) - (0.027) !! - 0.852 
Test of convergence !! 1 + ! !  (F-test) - 1.054 (n-s) 
Test of convergence based on the ratio of variances (2005/2012) 
                 !"# log !"# !  !"# log!"# !  
2005 0.0604 0.0538 
2012 0.0600 0.0386 
Ratio (F-test) 1.01(n-s) 1.39 (n-s) 
Notes: * and ** significant at 5% and 1%, respectively; (n-s) non-significant. The OLS regressions run using 
the whole sample (196 observations).  !! computed from OLS model with !"# !" ! !as dependent 
variable and !"# !" ! − 1 !as explanatory variable. By construction, both models give identical values for 
the β coefficient. 
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Productivity and performance in the public 
sector* 
 
Mathieu Lefebvre, Sergio Perelman and Pierre Pestieau 
 
In times of budgetary difficulties it is not surprising to see the performance of the public sector 
questioned. What is surprising is that what is meant by it, and how it is measured, does not seem to 
matter to either the critics or the advocates of the public sector. The purpose of this chapter is to 
suggest a definition and a way to measure the performance of the public sector or rather of its 
main components. Our approach is explicitly rooted in the principles of welfare and production 
economics. We will proceed in three stages. First of all we present what we call the "performance 
approach" to the public sector. This concept rests on the principal-agent relation that links a 
principal, i.e., the public authority, and an agent, i.e., the person in charge of the public sector unit, 
and on the definition of performance as the extent to which the agent fulfils the objectives 
assigned to him by the principal. Performance is then measured by using the notion of productive 
efficiency and of "best practice" frontier technique. We then move to the issue of measuring the 
productivity of some canonical components of the public sector (railways transportation, waste 
collection, secondary education and health care). We survey some typical studies of productive 
efficiency and emphasize the important idea of disentangling conceptual and data problems. This 
raises the important question that given the available data, does it make sense to assess and 
measure the productivity of such public sector activities? In the third stage we try to assess the 
performance of the overall public sector. We argue that for such a level of aggregation one should 
restrict the performance analysis to the outcomes and not relate it to the resources involved. As an 
illustration we then turn to an evaluation of the performance of the European welfare states and its 
evolution over time, using frontier techniques.  The results confirm that countries with lowest 
performance grew faster but this is not sufficient to confirm a path towards convergence.     
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